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There is a lack of consensus within the literature assessing whether surveillance is 
effective in reducing the seriousness of criminal events, with almost no prior study 
investigating its operation in cyberspace. This thesis seeks to address both of these 
domains while drawing on the deterrence perspective. Data were obtained from an 
experiment conducted over seven months at a large, public university within the United 
States.  Specifically, a series of virtual computers with known vulnerabilities were 
deployed into the university’s computer network as part of a randomized controlled trial.  
This thesis seeks to examine 1) whether a surveillance banner reduces the severity of 
offending through inhibiting hackers from escalating to active engagement with the 
system upon gaining access on the first session and 2) whether the deterrent effect of a 
surveillance banner persists beyond the first session. This surveillance banner produced a 
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    The incidence of computer trespassing in particular has been growing rapidly, 
and is one of the fastest growing branches of criminal conduct within the cyber domain 
(Furnell 2002).  McQuade defines computer trespassing as, “illegally gaining access to 
one or more computer systems after exploiting security vulnerabilities or defeating a 
security barrier” (2006: 83).  Indeed, the true prevalence of computer trespassing 
incidents throughout society is difficult to estimate due to the inability to adequately 
detect instances of computer trespassing at large. Nevertheless, a recent survey of IT 
managers conducted by the Ponemon institute (2011) found that over 90% of the 
represented US corporations detected multiple instances of computer trespassing 
incidents. These trespassing incidents are more than simple violations of privacy, as they 
may put sensitive data, financial sources, and proprietary records at risk of deletion, 
exploitation, or manipulation (Whitman 2003). According to Whitman (2003), data 
breaches to private and public U.S. corporations result in financial losses of billions of 
dollars annually in the U.S.    These computer trespassing incidents were criminal acts 
that serve as the platform for a wide range of further criminal conduct ranging from fraud 
to the outright destruction or corruption of industrial devices and software (McQuade 
2006). 
Extensive research has been conducted by scientists toward improving the 
detection of technical characteristics of computer trespassing incidents, and the 
development of defensive technologies that will prevent individuals from being able to 
trespass on a given computer system (Zhang et al 2003; Mackey 2003; Berthier and 
Cukier 2009).  However, this branch of research has not been driven by criminological 
models, and has typically been confined to means of target hardening at the border of a 
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network of computers connection with the internet through firewalls and other forms of 
intrusion prevention software (see Salles-Lousto et al 2011). Addressing this issue, the 
present study draws on draws on the deterrence perspective (Gibbs 1975; Jacobs 2010) 
and assesses the impact of a surveillance banner and a surveillance process upon the 
behavior of intruders during system trespassing incidents.  This analysis seeks to address 
several research questions related to an extension of deterrence theory to incorporate 
restrictive deterrence principles in identifying reductions in severity of offending, as 
constructed by Gibbs (1975) and Jacobs (2010). Specifically, this thesis seeks to address 
questions pertaining to absolute and restrictive deterrence.  First, I seek to answer 
whether a surveillance banner displayed upon entry to a computer system reduces the 
likelihood of recidivism in terms of subsequent system trespassing incidents.  Second, I 
ask whether a surveillance banner displayed upon entry to a computer system reduces the 
probability of an intruder actively engaging the system with a keystroke (presence of any 
commands typed into the console) during the first system trespassing incident?  Third, I 
explore if the effect of a surveillance banner on an intruder’s decision to actively engage 
with the system during a system trespassing incident persists beyond the first system 
trespassing session to subsequent sessions?  Lastly, I investigate whether a surveillance 
banner reduces the ratio of system trespassing incidents with keystrokes to all observed 
system trespassing incidents on a target system? 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 System Trespassing 
 
 System trespassing necessarily involves the unauthorized use and violation of the 
private use of property (Mcquade 2006). This can be seen to be analogous to home 
invasions and automotive theft, which also involve the unauthorized use and violation of 
2 
 
private property rights.  Unlike these somewhat analogous actions within the physical 
realm however, system trespassers can access a computer remotely through an internet 
connection in addition to locally logging into the computer through a medium physically 
and directly connected to the computer (Anderson 1980).  The damage resulting from a 
system trespassing session necessarily depends upon the motivation(s) of the intruder, 
and attacks can range in seriousness from benign queries of the internet to active 
manipulation of essential files on the target system and even launching denial of service 
attacks (Stallings 2005; McQuade 2006). 
 The past three decades have seen numerous efforts from technical researchers and 
politicians toward reducing the potential and incidence of system trespassing incidents.  
Technical researchers have been investigating techniques, software, and related solutions 
to detect and prevent unauthorized access of computer systems (Mackey 2003).  
Congress enacted the “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act” in 1986 in an effort to establish 
formalized sanctions for acts of computer violation and misuse; the sanctions inherent to 
violating this act extend to up to ten years of imprisonment.  The intended impact of this 
act and the belief that providing sanctions for a type of behavior will reduce the incidence 
of that conduct is in line with the deterrence-based assumption that individual behavior 
can be modified due to a fear of and the imposition of pending sanctions for criminal 
conduct (Paternoster 1987). 
2.2 Deterrence Theory and Restrictive Deterrence 
 
 Deterrence theory can be traced back to the utility-based principles presented 
through the works of Bentham (1785) and Beccaria (1764).  Both Bentham and Beccaria 
conceived of individuals as rational actors who were susceptible to the influence of 
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sanctions as they weighed the potential costs and benefits of committing a potential 
criminal act in what is termed a hedonistic calculus (Bentham 1785).  Deterrence theory 
extends this tradition to focus more exclusively on the individual influence of the 
severity, celerity, and certainty of sanctions in leading an individual to refrain from 
criminal conduct (Paternoster 1987).  The belief within this framework is that severe, 
certain, and swift punishments will be effective in increasing the costs associated with 
crime to the point of outweighing the benefits of crime, which leads to deterrence.  The 
theory has evolved and grown to incorporate additional factors and concepts, as theorists 
and researchers continue to investigate deterrence principles.  Branches of deterrence 
theory now attempt to account for the impact of punishment avoidance, whereby an 
offender commits a criminal act and goes without punishment in updating the offender’s 
perception of the certainty of punishment (Stafford and Warr 1993).  The work of 
Stafford and Warr is intrinsically related to the work of Becker (1968) as it distinguishes 
between objective and subjective sanctions in raising the distinction between the actual 
risks of sanctions and the individual’s perception of the risk of sanctions within a given 
context.  Anwar and Loughran (2011) provide evidence that the relationship between an 
individual’s perception of the risk of sanctions is dynamic and that individuals update 
their perception of the risk of sanctions in response to new information on the “true” risk 
of sanctions in a Bayesian learning model.  Importantly, theorists have also incorporated 
alternative outcomes to this deterrence model in order to differentiate between absolute 
and restrictive deterrence (Gibbs 1975). 
According to Gibbs (1975), absolute deterrence is whereby an offender is wholly 
deterred from engaging in any criminal conduct due to fear of the potential for receiving 
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sanctions. This abstention of criminal behavior within absolute deterrence is “absolute” in 
that it involves a complete refraining of engaging in this particular type of criminality on 
the part of the individual. In contrast, restrictive deterrence is a process whereby an 
offender is not wholly deterred from engaging in criminal conduct, but the offender’s 
behavior is modified in a specific manner to reduce the probability of receiving sanctions 
(Gibbs 1975; Jacobs 2010).  Restrictive deterrence primarily focuses upon reductions in 
the frequency (Gibbs 1975) and the severity (Jacobs 1993) of criminal offending in an 
effort to reduce the probability of being detected and receiving sanctions in response to 
deterring cues in the environment.  Criminologists have devoted considerable attention to 
the aforementioned contributions to the deterrence framework (Pratt et al 2006) with the 
notable exception of the restrictive deterrence principles. Prior to the current research, 
researchers have provided minimal treatment to these alternative outcome measures that 
should also be incorporated into deterrence-based research (Paternoster 1987; Jacobs 
1993). 
 Gibbs (1975) describes restrictive deterrence as, “the curtailment of a certain type 
of criminal activity by an individual during some period because in whole or in part the 
curtailment is perceived by the individual as reducing the risk that someone will be 
punished as a response to the activity” (1975: 33).  Gibbs’ initial conception of restrictive 
deterrence focused primarily upon the reduction in the frequency of criminal conduct, 
which necessarily limits the applicability of the constructs to those offenders who are 
already engaged in criminal conduct.  This platform was later extended by Jacobs to 
enable for both the analysis of an individual modifying the initial act of crime (Jacobs 
1993), and further to include reducing the seriousness of the criminal act, engaging in 
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modification behavior or measures that reduce the risk of detection, and altering the 
spatial-temporal component of the criminal event (Jacobs 2010). 
 Empirical analyses of restrictive deterrence theory as presented by Gibbs and 
Jacobs are still preliminary within the field with only a handful of authors attempting to 
test the theory against nature (Jacobs 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Jacobs and Cherbonneau 2012; 
Jacobs and Miller 1998; Paternoster 1989).  Jacobs (1996a) reports frequent location 
changes employed by crack dealers to avoid detection by both formal and informal agents 
within a neighborhood.  Jacobs (1996b) interviewed crack dealers and reported the 
nonverbal and verbal cues crack dealers were primed for to ascertain the likelihood of 
conducting a sale with a prospective buyer that was actually an undercover police officer; 
one such “test” was to check who a buyer knew in the neighborhood to establish 
credibility. Beauregard and Bouchard (2010) identify concealment measures and the use 
of gloves by rapists to reduce both the evidence left at the scene and the eventual 
likelihood of apprehension.  Jacobs and Cherbonneau (2012) observe auto thieves 
changing the license plate(s) of the car(s) they steal to avoid the cars coming up on the 
“hot” list of license plate numbers employed by police officers to identify stolen cars.  
Each of these measures is employed by the respective criminal(s) for the purpose of 
avoiding apprehension, but these findings do not touch upon the offender reducing the 
seriousness of their offense as a means to avoid apprehension.  Most of these analyses 
were largely qualitative (Jacobs 1993, 1996a, 1996b; Jacobs and Cherbonneau 2012) and 
based on relatively small sample sizes (Beauregard and Bouchard 2010; Jacobs 1996b; 
Jacobs and Cherbonneau 2012).  These studies also largely focused upon the 
modification behaviors employed by criminals to reduce the probability of receiving 
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sanctions.  This thesis seeks to contribute to this ongoing literature by investigating 
whether the seriousness of offending may also be impacted through this process and to 
see whether the principles of restrictive deterrence are evident in the realm of cyberspace. 
 The literature regarding the theoretical applicability of deterrence principles to 
cyberspace is mixed.  Some scholars have discounted the applicability and utility of 
deterrence to cyberspace on the grounds that the internet affords a high level of 
anonymity and this anonymity affords a great deal of difficulty in tying offenders to the 
criminal incidents with formal sanctions (Blank 2011).  Goodman (2010) disagrees with 
this assertion to claim that the immediate link between cyber-attacks and the respective 
criminal is not necessary to activate deterrence.  While this literature as to the 
applicability of deterrence to cyberspace remains inconclusive in the abstract, Maimon 
and colleagues (2014) have produced empirical results toward revealing a deterrence 
effect upon hacker behavior by virtue of a warning banner. 
 Maimon and colleagues (2014) assessed the impact of a warning banner displayed 
upon entry to the computer system on subsequent intruder behavior; they found that such 
a warning banner reduced the duration of system trespassing incidents on both the first 
session and repeated sessions on a target system.  This result provides empirical evidence 
for cyber attackers’ susceptibility to deterrence cues and the applicability of deterrence 
within cyberspace. The experiment discussed by Maimon and colleagues (2014) is part of 
a broader collection of ongoing experiments presently under study at a large, public 
university in the United States toward providing further empirical evidence regarding the 




2.3 Surveillance and Crime 
 
 Geerken and Grove (1975) define a system of deterrence as a “communication 
mechanism” that’s purpose is to inform offenders of three components: (1) the 
probability that a criminal act will be detected by authorities is high, (2) the probability of 
receiving sanctions once detected is high, and (3) the severity, or cost, associated with the 
sanction is great enough to offset the potential reward of the criminal act.  As such, a 
deterrent element or process’ degree of success is determined by the adequacy with 
which this deterring message is conveyed to the target actors, with those messages 
targeting the total population of potential offenders having the greatest success.  Geerken 
and Grove also distinguish between formal deterrence systems that operate through legal 
agencies and informal deterrence systems that operate at the interpersonal level.  I 
propose that, in keeping with this rationale afforded by Geerken and Grove (1975), 
displaying a targeted and specific surveillance warning or banner should serve as an 
effective platform for the purpose of imparting deterring cues.  Such a message should 
directly impart information pertaining to the risk of detection for a given offender.  An 
increase in the perception of the risk of detection is an immediate result of an effective 
deterrence system according to Geerken and Grove (1975) and it should activate the 
restrictive deterrent principles acknowledged by Jacobs (2010), resulting in an immediate 
reduction in the seriousness of offending in order to reduce the perceived risk of 
detection. 
In addition to a notification of a sanction threat, I suspect that the presence of 
surveillance means in the environment should also serve as an effective deterrent against 
the occurrence of a criminal incident (Nagin and Pogarsky 2003). One means of 
surveillance within the physical realm is the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) 
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cameras to record video images of a target area and send a signal containing that footage 
to a secondary location. While there has been extensive research conducted regarding the 
efficacy of CCTV cameras, results have been mixed with many studies finding a 
reduction in criminal conduct and others finding no effect for CCTV cameras (Welsh and 
Farrington 2008; Ratcliffe et al 2009).  Additionally, there has been scant attention on the 
interplay between the surveillance process and the individual’s perception of the risk of 
detection and perception of sanctions (Ratcliffe et al 2009).  This surveillance-based 
research has been confined to physical landscapes with regard to monitoring of real world 
spaces; this work seeks to extend this scope with respect to the potential for surveillance 
processes within cyber environments. 
2.4 The Present Study 
 
This thesis seeks to directly address the aforementioned empirical gaps through 
assessing the impact of a surveillance banner upon the seriousness of offending by 
intruders on a compromised computer system.  In accordance with restrictive deterrence 
principles, the seriousness of the system trespassing incident is assessed as an outcome 
measure related to the presence of a surveillance banner on the target computer system.  
Further, an increase in seriousness within a cyber-environment will result in a more 
extensive log file for and from the target system.  This can contribute to a would-be 
offender abstaining from escalating his or her offending if they believe this abstention 
will reduce the likelihood of detection, which could occur through the collection of log 
files in this instance.1  Importantly, absolute deterrence is not the appropriate mechanism 
1 Log file collectors are not necessarily identifiable by interfacing with a target computer directly as the 
collector could be on an external device to the target computer.  This results in a necessary ambiguity as to 
whether such a collector is actively collecting data on activity on the target computer. 
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in the context of this work, as I am interested in studying how contextual information 
intended to alter the intruder’s perceptions regarding the risk of detection and the 
corresponding probability of receiving sanctions operate within an environment with a 
low likelihood of receiving sanctions.  Nevertheless, the potential for an absolute 
deterrent effect is directly assessed as a primary hypothesis of this analysis. 
 The active engagement with a target system by typing directly into the console 
through inputting keystrokes of any kind is conceptualized as an increase in the 
seriousness of offending for the present analysis.  Each system trespassing incident is a 
criminal act and involves unauthorized access to a computer system.  However, any and 
all of the actions that can be engaged in during a system trespassing incident necessarily 
involve the execution of keystroke commands on the target system.  This thesis 
distinguishes between those system trespassing incidents during which the intruder typed 
into the system directly from those system trespassing incidents during which the attacker 
refrained from engaging with the system directly by typing in any commands or 
keystrokes. Regardless of the intent of the intruder, any actions performed on the system 
by the intruder beyond the initial unauthorized access of the system is a form of active 
manipulation of the system through either the use of resources to run the entered 
command or the purposive deletion of essential files.  It is following this rationale that 
this thesis advocates a keystroke session as a more serious form of a system trespassing 
incident.  This conception also fits within a restrictive deterrence framework as opposed 
to an absolute deterrence framework as the system trespassing incidents are still criminal 
events, but can be of a less serious nature due to a potential lack of keystrokes.  This lack 
of keystrokes can also be observed, albeit without complementary anecdotal evidence, as 
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a means to reduce the potential for sanctions, as there would not be as much information 
inserted into the aforementioned log file for the system if active monitoring and data 
recording were believed to be present by the intruder. 
The five hypotheses for this work are as follows: 
(1) The presence of a surveillance banner will not have an effect upon the likelihood 
of an attacker recidivating with repeated system trespassing incidents. 
A surveillance banner on a target system would only be displayed to a prospective 
offender upon successful entry to the computer system, which would constitute a system 
trespassing incident.  This form of banner is otherwise not visible to the offender while 
not connected to the target system.  As such, the effect of the banner upon an offender’s 
decision to return to the system, to recidivate, is expected to be marginal or lacking.  The 
presence of the surveillance banner on a target system is expected to alter the behavior 
during the given system trespassing incident, but not the offender’s decision to connect to 
the target system during subsequent instances. 
(2) The presence of a surveillance banner upon entry will reduce the probability of 
an attacker typing on the system on the first system trespassing incident. 
A surveillance banner should impart information to a would-be intruder that there is a 
heightened level of detection and/or monitoring on the target system. As such, this should 
increase the perceived risk of detection on the part of the offender.  One means by which 
the offender can reduce this potential for detection is through abstaining from actively 
engaging within the system through typing on the system through the input of keystrokes.  
This rationale follows that offered by Jacobs (2010) that offenders will reduce the 
seriousness of their offending if that reduction will reduce the risk of detection.   
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(3a) A surveillance banner will reduce the probability of an intruder typing on the 
system on the second system trespassing incident if the intruder did not type on the 
system during the first system trespassing incident for a given intruder. 
The restrictive deterrent effect hypothesized for the first system trespassing incident 
should extend to the second system trespassing incident for those intruders who do not 
actively engage with the system during the first system trespassing incident.  This class of 
offenders who choose not to actively engage with the system during the first system 
trespassing incident would include those individuals who otherwise would not have 
engaged with the system in terms of entering keystrokes as well as those individuals who 
were restrictively deterred by the presence of this banner on the system.  It is possible 
that this group of individuals retained perceptions of the certainty of detection that 
crossed the tipping point identified by Loughran and colleagues (2012) beyond which 
deterrence is most likely to occur.  While this tipping point is not observed directly due to 
an inability to query the offenders directly on their perceptions of the certainty of 
detection and receiving sanctions, it is a potential mechanism by which the surveillance 
banner may alter the behavior of the offenders.  In line with this rationale, this group of 
offenders should still be capable of being deterred on their respective second system 
trespassing incidents; these individuals’ perception of the certainty of punishment should 
theoretically remain unchanged as they did not actively engage with the system during 
the second system trespassing incident.  These individuals do not receive additional 
information with which to update their perceptions of punishment, as they did not 
escalate the offense and did not receive sanctions.  As such, these intruders should still be 
prone to restrictive deterrence during the second system trespassing incident as they 
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abstain from actively engaging with the target computer in the hope of reducing the risk 
of detection. 
(3b) A surveillance banner will not have an effect on the probability of an intruder 
typing on the system on the second system trespassing incident if the intruder 
previously typed into the system during the first system trespassing incident for a 
given intruder. 
The previous argument pertains to the sample of individuals who choose to not actively 
engage with the system during the first system trespassing incident, and are subsequently 
reasoned to be subject to deterrence principles during the second system trespassing 
incident.  However, the other sample of individuals, who chose to actively engage with 
the system, are conceived as containing those individuals who would engage in the 
criminal conduct regardless of the deterrence mechanism at play and those individuals 
whose perceptions of the certainty of detection was not sufficiently altered by the banner 
to prompt them to abstain from actively engaging with the system.  As this group of 
individuals was not previously deterred from actively engaging with the system, it is 
expected that they will likewise not be deterred during their second system trespassing 
incident.  Additionally, if there were no sanctions or consequences levied as a result of 
their active engagement with the system during the first system trespassing incident, this 
should result in a lower updated perception of the certainty of detection in line with the 
findings of Loughran and colleagues (2012).  As such, a null effect is expected with 
regard to the banner’s potential to reduce the probability of a keystroke on the second 
session for this group of individuals that actively engaged with the system previously 
during the first system trespassing incident. 
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(4) A surveillance banner displayed upon entry during repeated system trespassing 
incidents will reduce the ratio of system trespassing incidents with commands typed 
into the computer to the total number of system trespassing incidents for a given 
intruder. 
The aforementioned potential effects of the surveillance banner upon reducing the 
seriousness of the first system trespassing incident and a conditional impact upon the 
second system trespassing incident should also be observable within the ratio of system 
trespassing incidents with keystrokes to the total number of system trespassing incidents 
on a target system.  The restrictive deterrent effect should be in lesser magnitude for this 
calculated ratio, as once an intruder actively engages with the system and does not 
receive sanctions or consequences, then the perception of the certainty of detection and 
punishment should update to a reduced degree that is more reflective of reality (Loughran 
et al 2012).  The greatest impact should be most readily apparent on the first session 
during which the offender will not have experienced punishment avoidance (Stafford and 
Warr 1993) or have a reduced perception of the certainty of punishment due to repeatedly 
accessing the target computer without receiving sanctions.  Even so, this thesis predicts 
that there will still be a global reduction in the seriousness of the system trespassing 
incidents that occur in the presence of a surveillance banner. 
3. Experimental Design 
 
To test the above research hypotheses, the present study employed secondary data 
collected from a previously administered randomized controlled trial.  This experiment 
was conducted by a team of criminologists and engineers, and featured a two 
(surveillance banner vs no surveillance banner) x two (surveillance process vs no 
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surveillance process) factor design.  These four conditions can be described as (1) 
control, (2) surveillance banner only, (3) surveillance process only, and (4) both 
surveillance process and surveillance banner. 
3.1 Design 
 
 The experiment in question utilized 300 public IP addresses from a large, public 
university to deploy experimentally controlled and standardized target computers into the 
university’s network.2  The 300 IP addresses were from a single, continuous subnet 
devoted to this experiment.3  The target computers were virtually deployed and 
maintained from a set of physical servers housed within the respective university.  While 
there was not a physical box for each of the deployed target computers utilized in this 
experiment, the intruder cannot ascertain that the machine is virtually deployed and it 
does not affect the behavior of the system.  Each of these target computers was designed 
to be the equivalent of a real computer system running a version of the Linux-based 
operating system (CentOS).  Intruders who found the vulnerable computers sitting behind 
the 300 IP addresses will attempt to brute force entry onto the devices – typically with 
toolkits4 designed expressly for the purpose of cracking the legitimate login credentials to 
user accounts (McQuade 2006).  To aid in the simulation of the intruder acquiring the 
legitimate credentials to the system, a predefined number of attempts for each intruder 
2 An IP address is the public identification number that computer systems use to connect to the internet and 
communicate with one another.  IP addresses are allocated to individual machines attempting to join an 
existing network.  IP addresses can be either dynamic (changing while the machine is actively connected to 
the network) or static.  A single IP address consists of four numbers in sequence ranging from 1 to 256 
(e.g., 111.11.111.11).   
3 A subnet is a range of IP addresses (e.g., 111.11.111.1-111.11.111.256). 
4 These toolkits enable the prospective intruder to select a username to attempt to gain access to the system 
with.  Many users will initially target the user, root, as it is the standard admin user for linux-based systems 
that will retain heightened privileges within the computing environment over standard users.  This is 
supported by the findings presented in Tables 3 and 4 with the distribution of the user names used by 
intruders during the deployment. 
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was randomly set between 150 and 200 attempts.  This number of attempts limits the 
ability of human users to arbitrarily type in login credentials by hand, and stimulates the 
inclusion of those individuals who use brute force tool kits.  Most brute force toolkits do 
not report the number of trials needed to gain legitimate access to the system, so whether 
the threshold was set at 100 or 1000 attempts should not have an immediate bearing upon 
the resulting sample included in the study.  When this threshold is met, the login 
credentials used during this nth attempt are treated as the legitimate credentials for the 
target system.  These are the credentials that must be used to conduct system trespassing 
sessions following the initial deployment. 
 Randomization to a condition occurs at the point of deployment.  As soon as the 
intruder reached the predetermined nth attempt and gained access to the system, a random 
number was generated between 1 and 4 inclusive. This determined the experimental 
condition the offender’s target computer will receive for the full 30-day duration of the 
respective deployment.  This randomization procedure took place before the intruders 
could access the system, and can thus be considered to be exogenous to any and all 
differences observed on the target system over the course of a deployment. 
3.2 Overview of the Present Study 
 
The surveillance banner employed in the experiment takes advantage of a default 
welcome prompt to display a custom message.  This banner appears as follows on the 
target computer system: 
This system is under continuous surveillance. 




This banner is the first set of text seen upon each entry to a target computer with the 
surveillance banner condition.  The surveillance process employed in the experiment is a 
zabbix process inserted onto the system’s list of active processes called “Monitor.”  This 
process does not impact system performance, and is only visible if the intruder calls forth 
a display depicting all of the processes running on the system.5   
3.3 Sampling Procedure 
 
 This experiment did not actively solicit or attempt to encourage intruders to 
launch brute force attacks and receive the assignment of a target computer.  In contrast 
with most experiments conducted within criminology, an active sampling methodology 
was not employed in favor of a passive sampling methodology that placed computers 
with active vulnerabilities on specific port numbers into the university’s computer 
network.  Target computers were deployed onto the network for a period of seven months 
from April 4, 2013 until November 3, 2013 with data collection pertaining to system 
trespassing incidents continuing for an additional 30 days beyond this period.  These 
vulnerable computers, or honeypots, naturally attracted hackers that scan networks in 
search of computers with these known vulnerabilities (McQuade 2006).  As such, this 
experiment is largely passive with regard to sample matriculation.  It should be noted that 
while passive, this sampling procedure necessarily limits generalizable statements to 
those hackers who actively scan the subnets of this particular American university and 
conduct brute force attacks upon finding vulnerable systems.  This is not an innocuous 
limitation, as this necessarily implies that the sample imposed should theoretically retain 
a low perceived certainty of detection and/or receiving sanctions due to computer-
5 The linux command to call this information is “ps.”  This is analogous to bringing up the task manager 
and looking at the processes tab within a Windows OS environment. 
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focused crimes.  This is not far from reality as the actual likelihood of receiving official 
sanctions for scanning activity and potentially brute forcing entry to a single target 
system is believed to be low (McQuade 2006).  Further, this sample may not generalize 
directly to the entire population of hackers, as these computers are targets of opportunity 
as opposed to targets of choice.  Hackers that are more sophisticated and looking for 
specialized documents or information would not necessarily attempt to enter a linux-
based device that retains no inherent sensitive information or utility beyond its computing 
power.  However, there is reason to believe that the majority of hackers are looking for 
targets of opportunity as opposed to targets of choice, which should limit the impact of 
this sampling bias (McQuade 2006). 
3.4 Data 
 
 The collected data from this experiment were stored using three separate tables 
within a SQL6 database: “deployment,” “session,” and “keystroke.”  The deployment 
table retains information on the experimental condition assigned to each target computer, 
the IP address of the intruder, the country of origin of the intruder, the time of the 
deployment, the login credentials utilized to gain access, and a unique identifier for each 
deployment to join the deployment table with the session table.  The session table retains 
information on all of the system trespassing incidents recorded for the target computers 
following successful deployments.  This table has information on the start and end times 
for each session, the IP address of the intruder during the session, the country of origin of 
the intruder during the session, a unique identifier for each session to join the session 
table with the keystroke table, the login credentials utilized to gain access to the system, 
6 SQL is a database programming language 
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and a key indicative of the deployment to which a session belongs.  The keystroke table 
retains information on all of the commands entered into the system during system 
trespassing incidents.  This table contains the unique id associated with each session and 
every command typed into the system during the respective session as well as indicators 
for the screen that the command is attached to.7 
 These tables were joined using SQL queries and manipulated by hand to enable 
the proposed analysis.  Sessions had to be sequenced by hand to properly ascertain the 
ordering of sessions for a given deployment.  This operation was beyond the scope of the 
capabilities of SQL.  Numerous checks were employed to ensure and verify that all data 
managed by hand was authentic and accurate.  The detailed nature of this process 
revealed three observations for which there were technical errors in the data present 
within this database due to random factors resulting in negative session duration and 
multiple keystroke session entries; these observations have been excluded from the 
present analysis.  Information on the specific commands employed by the intruders 
during these sessions is beyond the scope of this analysis and not present within this 
resulting dataset.  This keystroke data in its raw form is not conducive to statistical 
analysis and will require extensive programming support from computer scientists to 
rework the data into a usable format. 
 
 
7 It is possible for an intruder to open and type into additional screens during a session on a linux system.  
One example pertains to the command “vim,” which opens up a text editor window.  The intruder can then 
script and insert commands into a file, which is then inserted into system memory.  However, the 
commands inserted into this file are not directly executed until the file in which they are entered is run.  
Information indicating whether commands are directly entered into the system or into a text editor is 
available within the keystroke table. 
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3.5 Outcome Measures 
 
Several terms must be explicitly defined for the purposes of the present analysis.  
A deployment occurs when an attacker launches a target computer following a successful 
brute force entry.  Each time the intruder returns and logs into the system is considered to 
be a system trespassing incident or a session.  A keystroke session is a system trespassing 
incident during which the hacker typed commands into the system.  A keystroke session 
is indicative of active engagement with the system that goes beyond simply connecting to 
the system via SSH.8  
 The relevant outcome measure for the present analysis pertains to whether any 
keystrokes are present and recorded for a given system trespassing session.  The presence 
of any keystrokes in a system trespassing incident is coded as a binary variable with (1) 
indicating the presence of at least one keystroke and (0) else.  This dichotomization is 
assessed within a sequence analysis of the sessions for a given deployment conditioning 
on whether a keystroke session was present on prior sessions for the respective 
deployment.  This analysis is kept at this level of abstraction as to simply whether any 
keystrokes are recorded for the given session. 
4. Methods 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 Descriptive information pertaining to the intruder’s actions following the 
deployment are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  As depicted in both tables, 1059 honeypots 




                                                          
were deployed over the seven-month period of deployments.  The total number of 
deployments across conditions ranges from 250 deployments in the process only 
condition to 275 deployments in the control condition.  Over 60 percent of the 
deployments retained at least one system trespassing incident during the respective thirty-
day data collection period for each deployment.  The average number of sessions per 
deployment with sessions is 4.458 with minimal differences between those honeypots 
that retained a surveillance banner versus those honeypots that did not retain a 
surveillance banner.  There was a total of 2942 sessions with 1318 of these sessions 
retaining a keystroke.  As depicted in both tables, the average keystroke ratios (as 
previously defined) are consistently distributed according to whether there is a banner on 
the system.  Both of the conditions with the surveillance banner have average keystroke 
ratios between 0.449 and 0.468 keystroke sessions per system trespassing incident.  Both 
of the conditions without the surveillance banner retain average keystroke ratios of 
roughly 0.49 keystroke sessions per system trespassing incidents.   
As the data utilized for this analysis come from a randomized controlled trial, it 
can be assumed that intruder characteristics, both observed and unobserved, will be 
balanced in expectation across conditions.  However, information is still observed 
regarding the intruder’s choice of IP address and username in brute forcing entry to a 
target computer within this research design and should be assessed for balance across 
conditions.  Significant differences are not found according to the country of origin 
across conditions (p=0.446) nor for the username employed during the brute force entry 
(p=0.498).  This balance over observables lends support to the assumption that pre-
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treatment observables will be balanced in expectation across the experimental conditions 
due to randomization. 
4.2 Analytic Method 
 
 Preliminary investigations suggest that less than 5% of the intruders actually 
investigated the processes on the system, with this rate dropping to below 2% for those 
systems actually retaining the process condition.  As such, the surveillance process 
should theoretically have a diminished to negligible effect upon subsequent behavioral 
outcomes.  This led to the decision of this thesis to consolidate the four conditions from 
the 2x2 factor design to look solely at the effect of the presence of the surveillance banner 
to take advantage of the added statistical power.  Concordantly, the control group and the 
process only group were consolidated into a single no banner group for subsequent 
analysis, while the banner only and banner and process groups will be consolidated into a 
banner group.  Sensitivity analyses were conducted to ensure that this methodological 
decision did not bias the ultimate results. 
Each of the hypotheses discussed within this work can be assessed and directly 
tested with a test of a difference in proportions according to whether the intruder was 
assigned to a condition retaining a surveillance banner.  There are no statistical controls 
necessary for assessing hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2, and hypothesis 3, as randomization 
occurred at the point of deployment and any differences observed following the 
deployment can be discussed as resulting from the imposed treatment.  One notable 
exception to this is with regard to testing hypotheses 3a and 3b wherein it is possible for 
the intruder to have typed commands into the computer on the session prior to the session 
presently under study.  These previously typed commands may have altered the system 
environment, and, as such, it is necessary to conduct conditional tests of proportions for 
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the second session, based upon whether or not there had been any commands entered 
onto the system during the first session.  This implies two separate tests of proportions – 
one for those intruders who had a keystroke on the first session and one for those that did 
not.  Sensitivity analyses were conducted for all aforementioned tests to ensure the 
decision to consolidate the data according to the presence of a surveillance banner does 
not impart any undue bias upon subsequent results. 
5. Findings 
5.1 Absolute Deterrence and Recidivism 
 The results of a test of the first hypothesis pertaining to absolute deterrence are 
presented in Table 3.  Recidivism is defined as conducting at least one system trespassing 
incident following the initial display of this surveillance banner.  The probability of 
recidivism amongst those attackers that did not receive a surveillance banner is 0.24 
while the probability of recidivism amongst those attackers that did receive a surveillance 
banner is 0.22.  This small difference is not found to be statistically significant (p=0.31) 
and lends tentative support for the first hypothesis, as I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no absolute deterrence effect of this surveillance banner upon the likelihood 
of recidivism.  This first hypothesis of a null effect cannot be proven directly, but the 
evidence presented in Table 3 does not run counter to expectations of a null effect with 
regard to absolute deterrence, as the surveillance banner is only visible during the system 
trespassing incident and no sanctions were imposed within the experiment under study.  
This finding is not sensitive to the duration of the first system trespassing incident, as 




[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.2 First Session Analysis 
 Table 4 depicts the findings pertaining to the analysis of a restrictive deterrent 
effect for the first session on a target computer.  Those intruders who received a 
surveillance banner escalated their offending to incorporate keystroke commands 36.4% 
of the time while those intruders who did not receive a surveillance banner escalated their 
offending 38.7% of the time.  This reduction of 2.3% due to the presence of a banner is 
not found to be statistically significant at any level of statistical significance, despite the 
estimated direction being consistent with a priori expectations.  However, sensitivity 
analyses reveal that this estimate may be biased downward due to the presence of 
sessions that were too short for an offender to both read the banner and input keystroke 
commands into the system.  Zero second duration and other short sessions could be 
prompted by connectivity issues, server issues, and/or human error in closing the window 
prematurely.  The distribution of these connectivity issues theoretically should not be 
related to assignment to receive a surveillance banner, especially with regard to zero 
second duration sessions as the intruder would not have been able to see nor read the 
surveillance banner in these instances.  These results that remove these potentially 
downward biasing observations are depicted in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. 
 Upon limiting the sample to those attackers that had a first session that was 
greater than zero seconds in duration, the estimated reduction in the likelihood of a 
keystroke on the first session due to the presence of a surveillance banner more than 
doubles to 4.6%.  This effect increases further to 5.4% when assessing those attackers 
that had a first session that was greater than five seconds in duration, which should allot 
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enough time for an attacker to read and process the assigned surveillance banner.  This 
reduction of 5.4% retains a probability of having occurred due to chance of 0.0949 if 
there was truly no restrictive deterrent process at play.  While not statistically significant 
by conventional standards, this sequence of consistent findings with regard to the 
restrictive deterrent effect of this surveillance banner in reducing the hacker’s likelihood 
of escalating their offending to incorporate keystroke commands offers some support 
toward the second hypothesis.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
5.3 Second Session Analysis 
 The analysis pertaining to the second session is not as straightforward as the 
above analyses that simply involved tests of differences in proportions.  While the banner 
in the previous tests could be treated as purely exogenous, this is no longer the case when 
assessing the second session for an attacker’s offending progression.  Attackers during 
the second session can differ from one another in this sample on the basis of whether or 
not they received a surveillance banner in addition to whether or not they actively 
engaged with the system by entering keystroke commands during the first session.  These 
previously entered keystrokes can be reasoned to provoke biases in assessing the effect of 
the surveillance banner on the probability of any keystrokes on the second session.  As 
such, this analysis assesses the effect of the surveillance banner on the probability of a 
keystroke on the second session for (1) the total sample of attackers having at least two 
sessions, (2) the subsample of this total that did not enter any keystrokes during the first 
session, and (3) the subsample of this total that did enter keystrokes during the first 
session.  These results are depicted in Table 5. 
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 The overall, or unconditioned, reduction in the probability of any keystrokes 
being entered into the system on the second session as a result of this surveillance banner 
is 4.5%, which is not found to be statistically significant with a test of differences in 
proportions (p=0.15).  However, in directly assessing hypothesis 3a regarding the 
conditional subsample of those attackers that did not escalate their offending during the 
first session on the target computer, this restrictive deterrent effect nearly doubles to a 
roughly 8.7% reduction that is nearly statistically significant by conventional standards 
(p=0.053).  As such, this thesis rejects the null hypothesis that the surveillance banner has 
no effect upon the likelihood of an offender with no prior escalation during the first 
session escalating their offending during the second session.  Put more simply, the 
surveillance banner appears to have a restrictive deterrent effect for this subsample of the 
sample in this analysis, as the probability of an attacker within this group escalating their 
offending during the second session decreases from 0.468 to 0.38 in the presence of the 
surveillance banner. 
 This thesis’ attention is then turned to the subsample of attackers that did enter 
keystrokes into the system during the first session.  For this subsample, there is no 
deterrent effect as the point estimate for the potential reduction due to the surveillance 
banner is in the incorrect direction with an increase in the probability of an escalation on 
the second session for this subsample from 63% to roughly 67% in the presence of the 
surveillance banner.  This result lends support to the aforementioned statement that the 
presence of a keystroke on the first session could be biasing results when evaluating the 
potential deterrent effect of the surveillance banner on the second session.  This apparent 
disparity in treatment effects for these two subsamples must be treated separately to 
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accurately portray the potential effect of the surveillance banner upon prospective 
hackers.  In sum, some support is found for hypothesis 3b regarding the null effect for the 
surveillance banner on the probability of a keystroke on the second session for those 
attackers that previously entered a keystroke during the first session. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.4 Global Keystroke Ratio 
 The global keystroke ratio, as previously defined, is the ratio of the number of 
sessions retaining at least one keystroke to the total number of sessions for a given 
honeypot’s 30 day duration within this experimental design.  The ratio for those attackers 
in the control group is 0.495 sessions with keystrokes per session recorded while the ratio 
for those attackers in the treatment group is 0.459 sessions with keystrokes per session 
recorded.  This is a reduction of 0.035 sessions with keystrokes per session recorded that 
is not found to be statistically significant by conventional standards with a p-value of 
0.1017.  A more meaningful interpretation of this effect would be a reduction in the 
severity of 35 sessions that would otherwise escalate out of a total of 1000 sessions.  
Although this result does not provide enough statistical evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no effect of the surveillance banner upon the global keystroke ratio, the 
direction of the estimated effect is consistent with the previous analyses that produced a 
restrictive deterrent effect for at least part of the sample under study. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6. Discussion 
This thesis expands upon the prior research into both system trespassing and 
restrictive deterrence by directly testing for restrictive deterrence with regard to the 
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severity of an attacker’s actions on a target system in the presence or absence of a 
surveillance banner.  Based upon these data and subsequent analyses, it would appear that 
this surveillance banner had a discernible effect upon reducing the likelihood of an 
attacker escalating toward actively engaging with the system through the medium of 
keystrokes.   
However, in line with a priori expectations, there was no discernible absolute 
deterrent effect within these data; the attackers continued to trespass on the system 
regardless of the display of this surveillance banner. Additionally, this assessment of 
absolute deterrence is inadequate in accordance with Gibbs’ (1975) conception of 
absolute deterrence as the complete abstention of a particular type of criminal conduct on 
the part of an offender.  This dataset only retains measures of an intruder’s behavior in 
relation to a specific target system; there is no record or means of tracking the intruder to 
assess whether the intruder modified his or her practice on other target computers in 
response to the display of such a surveillance banner on the system within this 
experiment. However, given the failure to identify a statistically significant effect of this 
surveillance banner in terms of absolute deterrence on the system retaining the 
surveillance banner, it is unlikely for there to be an effect on the intruder’s behavior in 
relation to other target systems. 
The effects observed for the first session are promising from a policy perspective 
as a delay of keystroke usage to later sessions constitutes added time for an IT 
practitioner to respond to and ameliorate the compromise on the target system.  As the 
previous discussion and Table 4 relate, the effect for the first session is not statistically 
significant by conventional standards, but the point estimates are in the hypothesized 
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direction with the presence of very short duration sessions serving as a confound in the 
analysis.  The consistency in the direction of the observed difference in addition to 
substantive reasons justifying this conditional analysis9 leads to this thesis’ stance of 
taking a less conservative benchmark with regard to statistical significance and 
interpreting the observed difference between the point estimates in this context as a 
restrictive deterrent effect. 
The unconditional probability of any keystrokes being entered on the second 
session presents a likewise confounded analysis of a potential deterrent effect.  Unlike the 
otherwise experimentally sound analysis of the first session, the second session analysis 
must condition on the presence of any keystrokes entered on the first session due to the 
potential for both intruders and systems linked to previous keystrokes being different 
from intruders and systems that are not linked to previous keystrokes.  The data bears this 
out, as those intruders who do not retain any previous keystrokes entered on the first 
session for a given target system are subsequently deterred from escalating their 
offending on the second session.  However, those intruders who entered any keystrokes 
on the first session are not deterred from entering subsequent keystrokes into the system 
during the second session.  This lends credence to a priori expectations that those 
attackers who enter keystrokes during the first session and subsequently receive no 
sanctions should update their perception of the certainty of detection to a lower value, 
which is in keeping with the general framework afforded by Loughran and colleagues 
(2012).  This updating procedure is not directly observed by this thesis, however, and is 
9 These substantive issues include connectivity issues, time to read the banner, and time to type into the 
system.  Short sessions of less than 5 seconds do not afford the same level of opportunity for intruders to 
interact with the system and respond to the surveillance banner. 
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merely noted as a potential mechanism underlying the observed effect for this subsample 
of the data.  These individuals who entered keystrokes during the first session were also 
far more likely to engage the system with additional keystrokes than those individuals 
who did not enter keystrokes during the first session regardless of assigned treatment 
condition.  This lends further support toward some form of splitting occurring within the 
sample of intruders, which is revealed in relation to temporally earlier behavior on a 
target system.  This heterogeneity within the population of intruders, while not a direct 
target of this analysis, is worthy of independent study and analysis, and retains substantial 
potential toward directing future policy and theoretical developments with regard to the 
efficacy of deterrence in cyberspace. 
The final test and result of the above analyses pertained to the global keystroke 
ratio of sessions wherein at least one keystroke was entered into the system as compared 
to the total number of sessions for a given deployment.  This result was not statistically 
significant at any conventional level of statistical significance, but the direction of the 
effect is consistent with previous analyses.  This is consistent with a priori expectations 
as the previously observed effects for the first and second sessions are inherently 
included within this more global analysis of the effect of a surveillance banner on 
curtailing an individual’s decision to actively engage with the system through entering 
keystrokes. 
These results retain implications for future theoretical development within the 
deterrence tradition both with regard to the severity component of restrictive deterrence 
and the continued application of deterrence principles to cyberspace.  These results 
coupled with the findings of Maimon and colleagues (2014) provide the beginning of an 
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empirical foundation upon which to support the continued assessment of and application 
of deterrence to cyberspace.  Absolute deterrence may not be the appropriate means by 
which to assess the efficacy of the deterrence process in cyberspace, but restrictive 
deterrence presents itself as a viable alternative.  With the relative ease with which 
individuals can conduct and commit computer-focused crimes, altering the pathways of 
these criminal behavior patterns may prove to be a fruitful course of action for deterrence 
theorists and cybercrime researchers.  These results contribute to the ongoing discussion 
in support of recognizing the human element inherent to cybercriminals as an additional 
modicum with which to prevent and modify cybercriminal activity. 
Additionally, policy implementation based upon these results is straightforward, 
cheap, and low-risk, as SSH banners similar to the one employed in this experiment can 
be applied with minimal cost and effort.  This thesis does not find any potential negative 
repercussions to altering an entry banner to a computer system in this fashion, as the 
system conditions are not physically modified to otherwise prevent legitimate user 
activity.  However, replication should still be sought before these results contribute 
directly to the enactment of policy protocols.  Additionally, experimentation with 
alternative wordings of the presented banner should be conducted to separate the effect of 
the content of the banner from the presentation of a banner upon entry to a computer 
system. 
7. Conclusion 
 This work sought to address numerous empirical gaps throughout the literature 
pertaining to both theoretical and policy development.  An absolute deterrent effect for a 
surveillance banner was not detected, but a restrictive deterrent effect appeared 
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throughout the data in assessing the three hypotheses predicting a deterrent effect.  These 
findings support the restrictive deterrence hypothesis, specifically the severity 
component, with regard to reducing the likelihood and prevalence of system trespassing 
incidents containing keystrokes.   
7.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
This work is not without limitation, though, as the results are not necessarily 
generalizable beyond the university setting in which the experiment took place.  Further 
research should investigate this deterrence process in alternate venues including 
government and/or commercial entities toward assessing whether this finding is 
externally valid.  The experiment from which data was obtained was limited to computers 
running a Linux-based operating system with SSH as the means of entry.  Further 
research is necessary to ascertain whether these results bear fruit toward reducing the 
severity of attacks targeting systems using alternate operating systems, system 
configurations, and/or means of access.  This experiment made an assumption that 
intruders would be English-literate in the construction of a banner that was displayed in 
English.  While this limitation would only serve to downward bias any obtained results 
from such an analysis, additional analyses identifying offenders directly toward 
ascertaining their knowledge directly would be beneficial to the field.  Along this vein, 
additional research that can more adequately identify intruders toward administering 
surveys and obtaining demographic and related personal characteristics beyond a 
proficiency in English is sorely lacking and would prove invaluable to future efforts in 
targeting innovations and policies derived from social sciences toward cyber security and 
cybercrime prevention.  Additionally, further research should extend this analysis with 
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regard to the potential for differential deterrence and further identifying heterogeneity 
within the population of system trespassers. Similar analyses should be conducted with 
regard to phenomena occurring within the physical realm to ascertain whether deterrence 
cues have an effect in reducing the severity of criminal behavior; the potential policy 















Appendix – Tables 
















Control 275 172 805 4.68 (5.667) 385 
0.492 
(0.366) 
Banner 263 155 641 4.135 (3.764) 255 
0.449 
(0.366) 
Process 250 164 686 4.183 (3.5) 311 
0.497 
(0.343) 
Both 271 169 810 4.793 (4.505) 367 
0.468 
(0.358) 
Total 1059 660 2942 4.458 (4.465) 1318 
0.477 
(0.358) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where appropriate. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Banner 
 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where appropriate. 
Table 3: Testing Hypothesis 1 – Absolute Deterrence and Recidivism 
 
Treatment Probability of Recidivism 
No Banner 0.241 (0.023) 
Banner 0.222 (0.023) 
Difference 0.019 (0.033) 
z-statistic 0.5737 
p-value 0.3091 





















Banner 534 324 1451 4.478 (4.174) 622 
0.459 
(0.362) 





Table 4: Testing Hypothesis 2 – Probability of any Keystrokes on the First Session 
with Varying Restrictions on First Session Duration 
 
Treatment With No Restriction First Session Longer Than Zero Seconds 
First Session Longer 
Than Five Seconds 















z-statistic 0.60 1.16 1.31 
p-value 0.2735 0.1231 0.0949 
n 660 607 581 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where appropriate. 
Table 5: Testing Hypotheses 3a and 3b – Probability of any Keystrokes on the 
Second Session Conditional on Prior Keystrokes on First Session 
 
Treatment Unconditional Probability 
Conditioned on NO 
Prior Keystrokes on 
First Session 
Conditioned on Prior 
Keystrokes on First 
Session 















z-statistic 1.02 1.62 -0.48 
p-value 0.1534 0.0528 0.6861 
n 507 339 168 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where appropriate. 
Table 6: Testing Hypothesis 4 – Global Keystroke Ratio 
 
Treatment Ratio of Keystroke Sessions to Total Sessions 
No Banner 0.495 (0.019) 
Banner 0.459 (0.02) 
Difference 0.035 (0.028 ) 
t-statistic 1.2733 
p-value 0.1017 
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